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Abstract
Ensemble approaches for uncertainty estimation have recently been applied to
the tasks of misclassification detection, out-of-distribution input detection and
adversarial attack detection. Prior Networks have been proposed as an approach
to efficiently emulating an ensemble of models by parameterising a Dirichlet
prior distribution over output distributions. These models have been shown to
outperform ensemble approaches, such as Monte-Carlo Dropout, on the task of
out-of-distribution input detection. However, scaling Prior Networks to complex
datasets with many classes is difficult using the training criteria originally proposed.
This paper makes two contributions. Firstly, we show that the appropriate train-
ing criterion for Prior Networks is the reverse KL-divergence between Dirichlet
distributions. Using this loss we successfully train Prior Networks on image classi-
fication datasets with up to 200 classes and improve out-of-distribution detection
performance. Secondly, taking advantage of the new training criterion, this paper
investigates using Prior Networks to detect adversarial attacks. It is shown that the
construction of successful adaptive whitebox attacks, which affect the prediction
and evade detection, against Prior Networks trained on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 takes a greater amount of computational effort than against standard neural
networks, adversarially trained neural networks and dropout-defended networks.
1 Introduction
Neural Networks (NNs) have become the dominant approach to addressing computer vision (CV) [1,
2, 3], natural language processing (NLP) [4, 5, 6], speech recognition (ASR) [7, 8] and bio-informatics
[9, 10] tasks. Notable progress has recently been made on predictive uncertainty estimation for Deep
Learning through the definition of baselines, tasks and metrics [11], and the development of practical
methods for estimating uncertainty using ensemble methods, such as Monte-Carlo Dropout [12]
and Deep Ensembles [13]. Uncertainty estimates derived from ensemble approaches have been
successfully applied to the tasks of detecting misclassifications and out-of-distribution inputs, and
have also been investigated for adversarial attack detection [14, 15]. However, ensembles can
be computationally expensive and it is hard to control their behaviour. Recently, [16] proposed
Prior Networks - a new approach to modelling uncertainty which has been shown to outperform
Monte-Carlo dropout on a range of tasks. Prior Networks parameterize a Dirichlet prior over output
distributions, which allows them to emulate an ensemble of models using a single network, whose
behaviour can be explicitly controlled via choice of training data.
In [16], Prior Networks are trained using the forward KL-divergence between the model and a target
Dirichlet distribution. It is, however, necessary to use auxiliary losses, such as the cross-entropy, to
yield competitive classification performance. Furthermore, it is also difficult to train Prior Networks
using this criterion on complex datasets with many classes. In this work we show that the forward
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KL-divergence (KL) is an inappropriate optimization criterion and instead propose to train Prior
Networks with the reverse KL-divergence (RKL) between the model and a target Dirichlet. In
sections 3 and 4 of this paper it is shown, both theoretically and empirically on synthetic data, that
this loss yields the desired behaviours of a Prior Network and does not require auxiliary losses. In
section 5 Prior Networks are successfully trained on a range of image classification tasks using the
proposed criterion without loss of classification performance. It is also shown that these models yield
better out-of-distribution detection performance on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets than Prior
Networks trained using forward KL-divergence.
An interesting application of uncertainty estimation is the detection of adversarial attacks, which are
small perturbations to the input that are almost imperceptible to humans, yet which drastically affect
the predictions of the neural network [17]. Adversarial attacks are a serious security concern, as there
exists a plethora of adversarial attacks which are quite easy to construct [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
At the same time, while it is possible to improve the robustness of a network to adversarial attacks
using adversarial training [17] and adversarial distillation [26], it is still possible to craft successful
adversarial attacks against these networks [21]. Instead of considering robustness to adversarial
attacks, [14] investigates detection of adversarial attack and shows that adversarial attacks can be
detectable using a range of approaches. While, adaptive attacks can be crafted to successfully attack
the proposed detection schemes, [14] singles out detection of adversarial attacks using uncertainty
measures derived from Monte-Carlo dropout as being more challenging to successfully overcome
using adaptive attacks. Thus, in this work we investigate the detection of adversarial attacks using
Prior Networks, which have previously outperformed Monte-Carlo dropout on other tasks.
Using the greater degree of control over the behaviour of Prior Networks which the reverse KL-
divergence loss affords, Prior Networks are trained to predict the correct class on adversarial inputs,
but yield a higher measure of uncertainty than on natural inputs. Effectively, this becomes a general-
ization of adversarial training [17] which improves both the robustness of the model to adversarial
attacks and also allows them to be detected. In section 6 it is shown that on the CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets it is more computationally challenging to construct adaptive adversarial attacks
against Prior Networks than against standard neural networks, adversarially trained neural networks
and MC-dropout defended networks. This is because, like ensembles, Prior Networks yield measures
of uncertainty derived from distributions over output distributions. Consequently, adaptive adversarial
attacks need to satisfy more constraints in order to attack Prior Networks and evade detection.
Thus, the two main contributions of this paper are the following: a new reverse KL-divergence loss
function which yields the desired behaviour of Prior Networks and allows them more complex datasets;
the application of Prior Networks to adversarial attack detection, enabled using the proposed training
criterion, where it is shown that whitebox adaptive attacks are more computationally expensive to
construct for Prior Networks than for baseline models.
2 Prior Networks
An ensemble of models can be interpreted as a set of output distributions drawn from an implicit
conditional distribution over output distributions. A Prior Network p(pi|x∗; θˆ) 1, is a neural network
which explicitly parametrizes a prior distribution over output distributions. This effectively allows a
Prior Network to emulate an ensemble and yield the same measures of uncertainty [27, 28], but in
closed form and without sampling.
p(pi|x∗; θˆ) = p(pi|α), α = f(x∗; θˆ) (1)
A Prior Network for classification typically parameterizes the Dirichlet distribution2 (eqn 2), which is
the conjugate prior to the categorical, due to its tractable analytic properties. The Dirichlet distribution
is defined as:
p(pi;α) =
Γ(α0)∏K
c=1 Γ(αc)
K∏
c=1
piαc−1c , αc > 0, α0 =
K∑
c=1
αc (2)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function. The Dirichlet distribution is parameterized by its concentration
parameters α, where α0, the sum of all αc, is called the precision of the Dirichlet distribution. Higher
1Here pi = [P(y = ω1), · · · , P(y = ωK)]T - the parameters of a categorical distribution.
2Alternate choices of distribution, such as a mixture of Dirichlets or the Logistic-Normal, are possible.
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values of α0 lead to sharper, more confident distributions. The predictive distribution of a Prior
Network is given by the expected categorical distribution under the conditional Dirichlet prior:
P(y = ωc|x∗; θˆ) =Ep(pi|x∗;θˆ)[P(y = ωc|pi)] = pˆic =
αˆc∑K
c=1 αˆc
(3)
The desired behaviors of a Prior Network, as described in [16], can be visualized on a simplex in
figure 1. Here, figure 1:a describes confident behavior (low-entropy prior focused on low-entropy
output distributions), figure 1:b describes uncertainty due to severe class overlap (data uncertainty)
and figure 1:c describes the behaviour for an out-of-distribution input (knowledge uncertainty).
(a) Low uncertainty (b) High data uncertainty (c) Out-of-distribution
Figure 1: Desired Behaviors of a Dirichlet distribution over categorical distributions.
Given a Prior Network which yields the desired behaviours, it is possible to derive measures of
uncertainty in the prediction by considering the mutual information between y and pi, given by the
following expression:
MI[y,pi|x∗; θˆ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Knowledge Uncertainty
= H[Ep(pi|x∗;θˆ)[P(y|pi)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total Uncertainty
− Ep(pi|x∗;θˆ)
[H[P(y|pi)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Data Uncertainty
(4)
The given expression allows total uncertainty, given by the entropy of the predictive distribution,
to be decomposed into data uncertainty and knowledge uncertainty, which are the two sources of
uncertainty. Data uncertainty arises due to class-overlap in the data, which is the equivalent of noise
for classification problems. Knowledge Uncertainty, also know as epistemic uncertainty [12] or
distributional uncertainty [16], arises due to the model’s lack of understanding or knowledge about
the input. In other words, knowledge uncertainty arises due to a mismatch between the training and
the test data.
3 Forward and Reverse KL-Divergence Losses
The original training criterion for Prior Networks is forward KL-divergence between the model and a
target Dirichlet distribution p(pi|β(c)), where the target concentration parameters β(c) depend on the
class c.
LKL(y,x,θ;β) =
K∑
c=1
I(y = ωc) · KL[p(pi|β(c))||p(pi|x;θ)] (5)
The target concentration parameters β are set as follows:
β
(c)
k =
{
β + 1 if c = k
1 if c 6= k (6)
This criterion is then jointly optimized on in-domain data Dtrain and out-of-domain training data
Dout as follows:
L(θ,D) =LKLin (θ,Dtrain;βin) + γ · LKLout (θ,Dout;βout) (7)
where γ is the out-of-distribution loss weight. In-domain βin should take on a large value, for
example 1e2, so that the concentration is high only in the corner corresponding to the target class, and
low elsewhere. Note, the concentration parameters have to be strictly positive, so it is not possible to
set the rest of the concentration parameters to 0. Instead, they are set to one, which also provides a
small degree smoothing. Out-of-domain βout = 0, which results in a flat Dirichlet distribution.
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However, there is a significant issue with this criterion. Consider taking the expectation of equation 5
with respect to the empirical distribution p^tr(x, y) = {x(i), y(i)}Ni=1 = Dtrain:
LKL(θ) = Ep^tr(x,y)
[ K∑
c=1
I(y = ωc) · KL[p(pi|β(c))||p(pi|x;θ)]
]
= Ep^tr(x)
[
KL
[ K∑
c=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x)p(pi|β(c))||p(pi|x;θ)
]]
+ const
(8)
In expectation, this loss is the KL-divergence between the model and a mixture of Dirichlet distribu-
tions, which has a mode in each corner of the simplex. When the level of data uncertainty is low, this
is not a problem, as there will only be a single significant mode. However, when there is a significant
amount of data uncertainty the target distribution will be multi-modal. As the forward KL-divergence
is zero-avoiding, it will drive the model to spread itself over each mode, effectively ’inverting’ the
Dirichlet distribution and driving the precision αˆ0 to a low value. This is an undesirable behaviour, as
the model should instead yield a distribution with a single high-precision mode at the center of the
simplex, as shown in figure 1b. Furthermore, this can compromise predictive performance.
The main issue with the KL-divergence loss is that the target distributions p(pi|β(c)) are arithmetically
summed in expectation. This can be avoided by instead minimizing the reverse KL-divergence
between the target distribution p(pi|β(c)) and the model:
LRKL(y,x,θ;β) =
K∑
c=1
I(y = ωc) · KL[p(pi|x;θ)||p(pi|β(c))] (9)
By taking the expectation of this criterion with respect to the empirical distribution, it becomes the
reverse KL-divergence between the model and a geometric mixture of target Dirichlet distributions:
LRKL(θ) = Ep^tr(x)
[ K∑
c=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x)KL
[
p(pi|x;θ)||p(pi|β(c))]]
= Ep^tr(x)
[
KL
[
p(pi|x;θ)||
K∏
c=1
p(pi|β(c))P^tr(y=ωc|x)]]
= Ep^tr(x)
[
KL
[
p(pi|x;θ)||p(pi|β¯)]]+ const
β¯ =
K∑
c=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x) · β(c)
(10)
A geometric mixture of Dirichlet distributions results in a standard Dirichlet distribution whose
concentration parameters β¯ are an arithmetic mixture of the target concentration parameters for each
class. When there is low data uncertainty this loss simply yields the reverse KL-divergence to a
sharp Dirichlet at a particular corner. However, when the data uncertainty is significant, this loss
minimizes the reverse KL-divergence to a Dirichlet with a single mode close to the center of the
simplex. This is exactly the behaviour which the model should learn when there is an in-domain input
in a region of significant data uncertainty. Thus, target distribution is always a standard uni-modal
Dirichlet. Furthermore, as a consequence of this loss, the concentration parameters are appropriately
interpolated on the boundary of the in-domain and out-of-distribution regions, where the degree of
interpolation depends on the OOD loss weight γ. Finally, it is necessary to point out that the reverse
KL-divergence is commonly used in variational inference [29] and training variational auto-encoders
[30].
It is interesting to further analyze the properties of the reverse KL-divergence by decomposing it into
the reverse cross-entropy and the negative differential entropy:
LRKL(θ;β) = Ep^tr(x)
[
Ep(pi|x;θ)
[− ln Dir(pi|β¯)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reverse Cross−Entropy
− H[p(pi|x;θ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Differential Entropy
]
(11)
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Lets consider the reverse-cross entropy term in more detail (and dropping additive constants):
LRCE(θ;β) = Ep^tr(x)
[
Ep(pi|x;θ)
[
−
K∑
c=1
K∑
k=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x)
(
β
(c)
k − 1
)
lnpik
]]
= Ep^tr(x)
[
−
K∑
c=1
K∑
k=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x)
(
β
(c)
k − 1
)(
ψ(αˆk)− ψ(αˆ0)
)] (12)
When the target concentration parameters β(c)are defined as in equation 6, the form of the reverse
cross-entropy will be:
LRCE(θ;β) = Ep^tr(x)
[
− β
K∑
c=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x)
(
ψ(αˆc)− ψ(αˆ0)
)]
(13)
This expression for the reverse cross entropy is a scaled version of an upper-bound to the cross
entropy between discrete distributions, obtained via Jensen’s inequality, which was proposed in a
parallel work [31] that investigated a model similar to Dirichlet Prior networks:
LNLL−UB(θ) = Ep^tr(x)
[
−
K∑
c=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x)
(
ψ(αˆc)− ψ(αˆ0)
)]
(14)
This form of this upper bound loss is identical to standard negative log-likelihood loss, except with
digamma functions instead of natural logarithms. This loss can be analyzed further by considering
the following asymptotic series approximation to the digamma function:
ψ(x) = lnx− 1
2x
+O(x2) ≈ lnx− 1
2x
(15)
Given this approximation, it is easy to show that this upper-bound loss is equal to the negative
log-likelihood plus an extra term which drives the concentration parameter αˆc to be as large as
possible:
LNLL−UB(θ) = Ep^tr(x)
[
−
K∑
c=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x)
(
ψ(αˆc)− ψ(αˆ0)
)]
≈ Ep^tr(x)
[
−
K∑
c=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x)
(
ln(pˆic)− 1− pˆi
2αˆc
)]
= LNLL(θ) + Ep^tr(x)
[ K∑
c=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x)
(1− pˆi
2αˆc
)]
(16)
Thus, the reverse KL-divergence between Dirichlet distributions, given setting of target concentration
parameters via equation 6, yields the following expression:
LRKL(θ;β) ≈ β · LNLL(θ) + Ep^tr(x)
[
β
K∑
c=1
P^tr(y = ωc|x)
(1− pˆi
2αˆc
)−H[p(pi|x;θ)]] (17)
Clearly, this expression is equal to the standard negative log-likelihood loss for discrete distributions,
weighted by β, plus a term which drives the precision αˆ0 of the Dirichlet to be β +K, where K is
the number of classes.
4 Experiments on Synthetic Data
The previous section investigated the theoretical properties of forward and reverse KL-divergence
training criteria for Prior Networks. In this section these criteria are assessed empirically by using
them to train Prior Networks on the artificial high-uncertainty 3-class dataset3 introduced in [16]. In
3Described in appendix A.
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these experiments, the out-of-distribution training data Dout was sampled such that it forms a thin
shell around the training data. The target Dirichlet concentration parameters β(c) were constructed as
described in equation 6, with βin = 1e2 and βout = 0. The in-domain loss and out-of-distribution
losses were equally weighted when trained using forward KL-divergence. However, it was found that
it is necessary to weight the out-of-distribution loss 10 times as much as the in-domain loss when
using reverse KL divergence.
(a) Total Uncertainty - KL (b) Data Uncertainty - KL (c) Mutual Information - KL
(d) Total Uncertainty - RKL (e) Data Uncertainty - RKL (f) Mutual Information - RKL
Figure 2: Comparison of measures of uncertainty derived from Prior Networks trained with forward
and reverse KL-divergence. Measures of uncertainty are derived via equation 4.
Figure 2 depicts the total uncertainty, expected data uncertainty and mutual information, which is
a measure of knowledge uncertainty, derived using equation 4 from Prior Networks trained using
both criteria. By comparing figures 2a and 2d it is clear that a Prior Network trained using forward
KL-divergence over-estimates total uncertainty in domain, as the total uncertainty is equally high
along the decision boundaries, in the region of class overlap and out-of-domain. The Prior Network
trained using the reverse KL-divergence, on the other hand, yields an estimate of total uncertainty
which better reflects the structure of the dataset. Figure 2b shows that the expected data uncertainty
is altogether incorrectly estimated by the Prior Network trained via forward KL-divergence, as
it is uniform over the entire in-domain region. As a result, the mutual information is higher in-
domain along the decision boundaries than out-of-domain. In contrast, figures 2c and 2f show that
the measures of uncertainty provided by a Prior Network trained using the reverse KL-divergence
decompose correctly - data uncertainty is highest in regions of class overlap while mutual information
is low in-domain and high out-of-domain. Thus, these experiments support the analysis in the previous
section, and illustrate how the reverse KL-divergence is a more suitable optimization criterion than
forward KL-divergence.
5 Image Classification Experiments
Having evaluated the forward and reverse KL-divergence losses on a synthetic dataset in the previous
section, we now evaluate these losses on a range of image classification datasets. The training
configurations are described in appendix B. Table 1 presents the classification error rates of standard
DNNs, an ensemble of 5 DNNs [13], and Prior Networks trained using both the forward and reverse
KL-divergence losses. From table 1 it is clear that Prior Networks trained using forward KL-
divergence (PN-KL) achieve increasingly worse classification performance as the datasets become
more complex and have a larger number of classes. At the same time, Prior Networks trained using
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the reverse KL-divergence loss (PN-RKL) have similar error rates as ensembles and standard DNNs.
Note that in these experiments no auxiliary losses were used.
Table 1: Mean classification performance (% Error) ±2σ across 5 random initializations. Error rates
for PN-KL on CIFAR-100 and TinyImageNet are not presented as the models failed to train on these
datasets using the forward KL-divergence.
Dataset DNN PN-KL PN-RKL ENSM
MNIST 0.5 ±0.1 0.6 ±0.1 0.5 ±0.1 0.5 ± NA
SVHN 4.3 ±0.3 5.7 ±0.2 4.2 ±0.2 3.3 ± NA
CIFAR-10 8.0 ±0.4 14.7 ±0.4 7.5 ±0.3 6.6 ± NA
CIFAR-100 30.4 ±0.6 - 28.1 ±0.2 26.9 ± NA
TinyImageNet 41.7 ±0.4 - 40.3 ±0.4 36.9 ± NA
Table 2 presents the out-of-distribution detection performance of Prior Networks trained on CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100 [32] using the forward and reverse KL-divergences. Prior Networks trained on
CIFAR-10 use CIFAR-100 are OOD training data, while Prior Networks trained on CIFAR-100
use TinyImageNet [33] as OOD training data. Performance is assessed using area under an ROC
curve (AUROC) in the same fashion as in [16, 11]. The results on CIFAR-10 show that PN-RKL
consistently yields better performance than PN-KL and the ensemble on all OOD test datasets (SVHN,
LSUN and TinyImagenet). The results using model trained on CIFAR-100 show that Prior Networks
are capable of out-performing the ensembles when evaluated against the LSUN and SVHN datasets.
However, Prior Networks have difficulty distinguishing between the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 test
sets. However, this represents a limitation of the both the classification model and the OOD training
data, rather than the training criterion. Improving classification performance of Prior Networks on
CIFAR-100, which improves understanding of what is ’in-domain’, and using a more appropriate
OOD training dataset, which provides a better contrast, is likely improve OOD detection performance.
Table 2: Out-of-domain detection results (mean % AUROC ±2σ across 5 rand. inits) using mutual
information (eqn. 4) derived from models trained on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
Model CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
SVHN LSUN TinyImageNet SVHN LSUN CIFAR-10
ENSM 89.5 ± NA 93.2 ± NA 90.3 ± NA 78.9 ± NA 85.6 ± NA 76.5 ± NA
PN-KL 97.8 ±1.1. 91.6 ±1.7 92.4 ±0.9 - - -
PN-RKL 98.2 ±1.1 95.7 ±0.9 95.7 ±0.7 84.8 ±0.8 100.0 ±0.0 57.8 ±0.4
6 Adversarial Attack Detection
Having developed a new training criterion for Prior Networks which allows them to scale to more
complex datasets and gives greater control over their behaviour, we now investigate using measures of
uncertainty derived from Prior Networks to detect adversarial attacks. Detection of adversarial attacks
via measures of uncertainty was previously studied in [14], where it was shown that Monte-Carlo
dropout ensembles yield measures of uncertainty which are more challenging to attack than other
considered methods. Like Monte-Carlo dropout, Prior Networks yield rich measures of uncertainty
derived from distributions over distributions. This means that for adversarial attacks to both affect the
prediction and evade detection, they must be located in a region of input space within the decision
boundary of the desired target class, and where both the relative magnitudes of the logits (distribution
over classes) and absolute magnitude of the logits (distribution over distributions) are the same as for
natural inputs. Clearly, this constrains the space of possible solutions to the optimization problem
which yields adversarially attacks. Furthermore, the behavior of Prior Networks can be explicitly
controlled for particular input regions via choice of out-of-distribution training data, for example
adversarial attacks. This further constrains the space of solutions to the optimization problem which
yields detection-evading adversarial attacks.
Thus, in the following experiments Prior Networks are trained on adversarially perturbed inputs
as out-of-distribution data. The models are trained to both yield the correct prediction and high
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measures of uncertainty for adversarially modified inputs. During training, targeted adversarial
attacks are generated via the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [17] which minimizes the reverse
KL-divergence (eqn 10) between the Prior Network and a sharp Dirichlet distribution (βin = 1e2)
focused on a randomly chosen class which is not the true class of the training image. The Prior
Network is then jointly trained to yield either a sharp or wide Dirichlet distribution at the appropriate
corner of the simplex for natural or adversarial data, respectively. The target concentration parameters
are set using equation 6, where βin = 1e2 for natural and βadv = 1 for adversarial data. This
approach can be seen as a generalization of adversarial training [17, 25], where models are trained to
predict the correct class on a set of adversarially perturbed inputs. The difference is that here we are
training the model to yield a particular behaviour of an entire distribution over output distributions,
rather than simply making sure that the decision boundaries are correct in regions of input space
which correspond to adversarial attacks.
As discussed in [14, 34], approaches to detecting adversarial attacks need to be evaluated against
adaptive whitebox attacks which have full knowledge of the detection scheme and actively seek to
bypass it. Here, we consider two types of targeted, iterative PGD-MIM [20, 25] attacks which aim to
switch the prediction to a target class while leaving the measures of uncertainty derived from Prior
Networks or DNNs (entropy, mutual information) unchanged. The first approach is to simply permute
the predicted distribution over classes and swap the probabilities of the max and target classes. The
loss function minimized by the adversarial generation process will be the forward KL-divergence
between the predicted distribution over class labels P(y|x˜; θˆ) and the target permuted distribution
Pt(y). For Prior Networks, the equivalent approach would be to permute the concentration parameters
αˆ and to minimize forward KL divergence to the permuted target Dirichlet distribution:
LKLPMF
(
P(y|x˜; θˆ), t) =KL[Pt(y)||P(y|x˜; θˆ)], LKLDIR(p(pi|x˜; θˆ), t) = KL[pt(pi)||p(pi|x˜; θˆ)] (18)
However, it was found4 that LKLPMF yields more aggressive attacks than LKLDIR, which is why only
attacks generated via LKLPMF are considered here. The target for these attacks is always the second
most likely class, as that represents the least ’unnatural’ perturbation of the outputs.
In the following set of experiments Prior Networks are trained on either the CIFAR-10 or CIFAR-100
datasets [32] using the procedure defined above. Details of the experimental configuration can be
found in appendix B. The baseline models are an undefended DNN and a DNN trained using standard
adversarial training (DNN-ADV). For these models uncertainty is estimated via the entropy of the
predictive posterior. Additionally, estimates of mutual information (knowledge uncertainty) are
derived via a Monte-Carlo dropout ensemble generated from each of these models. Similarly, Prior
Networks also use the mutual information (eqn. 4) for adversarial attack detection. Performance
is assessed via the Success Rate, AUROC and Joint Success Rate (JSR). For the ROC curves
considered here the true positive rate is computed using natural examples, while the false-positive
rate is computed using only successful adversarial attacks5. The JSR, described in greater detail in
appendix C, is the equal error rate where false positive rate equals false negative rate, and allows joint
assessment of adversarial robustness and detection.
The results presented in figure 3 show that on both the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets whitebox
attacks successfully change the prediction of DNN and DNN-ADV models to the second most likely
class and evade detection (AUROC goes to 50). Monte-Carlo dropout ensembles are marginally
harder to adversarially overcome, due to the random noise. At the same time, it takes far more
iterations of gradient descent to successfully attack Prior Networks such that they fail to detect the
attack. On CIFAR-10 the Joint Success Rate is only 0.25 at 1000 iterations, while the JSR for the
other models is 0.5 (the maximum). Results on the more challenging CIFAR-100 dataset show
that adversarially trained Prior Networks yield a more modest increase in robustness over baseline
approaches, but it still takes significantly more computational effort to attack the model. Thus,
these results support the assertion that adversarially trained Prior Networks constrain the solution
space for adaptive adversarial attack, making them computationally more difficult to successfully
construct. At the same time, blackbox attacks, computed on identical networks trained on the same
data from a different random initialization, fail entirely against Prior Networks trained on CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100. This shows that the adaptive attacks considered here are non-transferable.
4Results are described in appendix D.
5The may result in minimum AUROC performance being a little greater than 50 is the success rate is not 100
%, as is the case with MCDP AUROC in figure 3.
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(a) C10 Whitebox Success Rate (b) C10 Whitebox AUROC (c) C10 Whitebox JSR
(d) C100 Whitebox Success Rate (e) C100 Whitebox ROC AUC (f) C100 Whitebox JSR
(g) PN Blackbox Success Rate (h) PN Blackbox AUROC (i) PN Blacbox JSR
Figure 3: Adaptive Attack detection performance in terms of mean Success Rate, % AUROC and
Joint Success Rate (JSR) across 5 random inits. L∞ bound on adversarial perturbation is 30 pixels.
7 Conclusion
Prior Networks have been shown to be an interesting approach to emulating ensembles, allowing rich
and interpretable measures of uncertainty to be derived from neural networks. This work consists
of two main contributions which aim to improve these models. Firstly, a new training criterion
for Prior Networks, the reverse KL-divergence between Dirichlet distributions, is proposed. It is
shown, both theoretically and empirically, that this criterion yields the desired set of behaviours
of a Prior Network and allows these models to be trained on more complex datasets with a large
number of classes. Furthermore, it is shown that this loss improves out-of-distribution detection
performance on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets relative to the forward KL-divergence loss
used in [16]. However, it is necessary to investigate proper choice of out-of-distribution training data,
as an inappropriate choice can limit OOD detection performance on complex datasets. Secondly, this
improved training criterion enables Prior Networks to be applied to the task of detecting whitebox
adaptive adversarial attacks. It is shown that it is significantly more computationally challenging to
construct successfully adaptive whitebox PGD attacks against Prior Network than against baseline
models. Thus, adversarial training of Prior Networks can be seen as a generalization of standard
adversarial training which improves both robustness to adversarial attacks and the ability to detect
them by placing more constraints on the space of solutions to the optimization problem which yields
adversarial attacks. It is necessary to point out that the evaluation of adversarial attack detection
using Prior Networks is limited to only strong L∞ attacks. It is of interest to assess how well Prior
Networks are able to detect adaptive C&W L2 attacks [21] and EAD L1 attacks [35]. However, one
challenge with these attacks is the adaptation of their loss functions to Prior Networks, which is left
for future work.
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Appendix A Synthetic Experiments
The current appendix describes the high data uncertainty artificial dataset used in section 4 of
this paper. This dataset is sampled from a distribution ptr(x, y) which consists of three normally
distributed clusters with tied isotropic covariances with equidistant means, where each cluster
corresponds to a separate class. The marginal distribution over x is given as a mixture of Gaussian
distributions:
ptr(x) =
3∑
c=1
ptr(x|y = ωc) · Ptr(y = ωc) = 1
3
3∑
c=1
N (x;µc, σ2 · I) (19)
The conditional distribution over the classes y can be obtained via Bayes’ rule:
Ptr(y = ωc|x) = ptr(x|y = ωc) · Ptr(y = ωc)∑3
k=1 ptr(x|y = ωk) · Ptr(y = ωk)
=
N (x;µc, σ2 · I)∑3
k=1N (x;µk, σ2 · I)
(20)
This dataset is depicted for σ = 4 below. The green points represent the ’out-of-distribution’ training
data, which is sampled close to the in-domain region. The Prior Networks considered in section 4 are
trained on this dataset. Figure 5 depicts the behaviour of the differential entropy of Prior Networks
Figure 4: High Data Uncertainty artificial dataset.
trained on the high data uncertainty artificial dataset using both KL-divergence losses. Unlike the
total uncertainty, expected data uncertainty and mutual information, it is less clear what is the desired
behaviour of the differential entropy. Figure 5 shows that both losses yield low differential entropy
in-domain and high differential entropy out-of-distribution. However, the reverse KL-divergence
seems to capture more of the structure of the dataset, which is especially evident in figure 5b, than
the forward KL-divergence. This suggests that the differential entropy of Prior Networks trained
via reverse KL-divergence is a measures of total uncertainty, while the differential entropy of Prior
Networks trained using forward KL-divergence is a measure of knowledge uncertainty. The latter is
consistent with results in [16].
(a) Differential Entropy PN-KL (b) Differential Entropy PN-RKL
Figure 5: Differential Entropy derived from Prior Networks trained with forward and reverse KL-
divergence loss.
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Appendix B Experimental Setup
Table 3: Description of datasets in terms of number of images and classes.
Dataset Train Valid Test Classes
MNIST 55000 5000 10000 10
SVHN 73257 - 26032 10
CIFAR-10 50000 - 10000 10
LSUN - - 10000 10
CIFAR-100 50000 - 10000 100
TinyImagenet 100000 10000 10000 200
The current appendix describes the experimental setup and datasets used for experiments considered
in this paper. Table 3 describes the datasets used in terms of their size and numbers of classes.
Table 4: Training Configurations. η0 is the initial learning rate, γ is the out-of-distribution loss weight
and β is the concentration of the target class. The batch size for all models was 128. Dropout rate is
quoted in terms of probability of not dropping out a unit.
Training Model η0 Epochs
Cycle Dropout γ βin OOD dataDataset Length
MNIST
DNN
1e-3 20 10 0.5
-
PN-KL 0.0 1e3 -PN-RKL
SVHN
DNN 1e-3
40 30
0.5 -
PN-KL 5e-4 0.7 1.0 1e3 CIFAR-10PN-RKL 5e-6 0.7 10.0
CIFAR-10
DNN 1e-3 45 30 0.5 - - -DNN-ADV FGSM-ADV
PN-KL 5e-4 45 30 0.7 1.0 1e2 CIFAR-100PN-RKL 5e-6 10.0
PN 5e-6 45 30 0.7 30.0 1e2 FGSM-ADV
CIFAR-100
DNN 1e-3 100 70 0.5 - - -DNN-ADV FGSM-ADV
PN-KL 5e-4 100 70 0.7 1.0 1e2 TinyImageNetPN-RKL 5e-6 10.0
PN 5e-4 100 70 0.7 30.0 1e2 FGSM-ADV
TinyImageNet
DNN 1e-3
120 80 0.5
-
PN-KL 5e-4 0.0 1e2 -PN-RKL 5e-6
All models considered in this paper were implemented in Tensorflow [36] using the VGG-16 [2]
architecture for image classification, but with the dimensionality of the fully-connected layer reduced
down to 2048 units. DNN models were trained using the negative log-likelihood loss. Prior Networks
were trained using both the forward KL-divergence (PN-KL) and reverse KL-divergence (PN-RKL)
losses to compare their behaviour on more challenging datasets. Identical target concentration
parameters β(c) were used for both the forward and reverse KL-divergence losses. All models were
trained using the Adam [37] optimizer, with a 1-cycle learning rate policy and dropout regularization.
In additional, data augmentation was done when training models on the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and
TinyImageNet datasets via random left-right flips, random shifts up to±4 pixels and random rotations
by up to ± 15 degrees. The details of the training configurations for all models and each dataset can
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be found in table 4. 5 models of each type were trained starting from different random seeds. The 5
DNN models were evaluated both individually (DNN) and as an explicit ensemble of models (ENS).
B.1 Adversarial Attack Generation
An adversarial input xadv will be defined as the output of a constrained optimization process Aadv
applied to a natural input x:
Aadv(x, ωt) = arg min
x˜∈RD
{
L(y = ωt, x˜, θˆ)} : δ(x, x˜) <  (21)
The loss L is typically the negative log-likelihood of a particular target class y = ωt:
L(y = ωt, x˜, θˆ) = − ln P(y = ωt|x˜; θˆ) (22)
The distance δ(·, ·) represents a proxy for the perceptual distance between the natural sample x and
the adversarial sample x˜. In the case of adversarial images δ(·, ·) is typically the L1, L2 or L∞
norm. The distance δ(·, ·) is constrained to be within the set of allowed perturbations such that the
adversarial attack is still perceived to be a natural input to a human observer. First-order optimization
under a Lp constraint is called Projected Gradient Descent [25], where the solution is projected back
onto the Lp-norm ball whenever it exceeds the constraint.
There are multiple ways in which the PGD optimization problem 21 can be solved [17, 18, 19, 20, 25].
The simplest way to generate an adversarial example is via the Fast Gradient Sign Method or FGSM
[18], where the sign of the gradient of the loss with respect to the input is added to the input:
xadv = x−  · sign(∇xL
(
ωt,x, θˆ
)
) (23)
Epsilon controls the magnitude of the perturbation under a particular distance δ(x,xadv), the L∞
norm in this case. A generalization of this approach to other Lp norms, called Fast Gradient Methods
(FGM), is provided below:
xadv = x−  ·
∇xL
(
ωt,x, θˆ
)
||∇xL
(
yt,x, θˆ
)||p (24)
FGM attacks are simple adversarial attacks which are not always successful. A more challenging class
of attacks are iterative FGM attacks, such as the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [19] and Momentum
Iterative Method (MIM) [20], and others [21, 35]. However, as pointed out by Madry et. al [25], all
of these attacks, whether one-step or iterative, are generated using variants of Projected Gradient
Descent to solve the constrained optimization problem in equation 21. Madry [25] argues that all
attacks generated using various forms of PGD share similar properties, even if certain attacks use
more sophisticated forms of PGD than others.
In this work MIM L∞ attacks, which are considered to be strong L∞ attacks, are used to attack all
models considered in section 6. However, standard targeted attacks which minimize the negative
log-likelihood of a target class are not adaptive to the detection scheme. Thus, in this work adaptive
targeted attacks are generated by minimizing the losses proposed in section 6, in equation 18.
The optimization problem in equation 21 contains a hard constraint, which essentially projects the
solutions of gradient descent optimization to the allowed Lp-norm ball whenever δ(·, ·) is larger than
the constraint. This may be both disruptive to iterative momentum-based optimization methods. An
alternative soft-constraint formulation of the optimization problem is to simultaneously minimize the
loss as well as the perturbation δ(·, ·) directly:
Aadv(x, t) = arg min
x˜∈RK
{
L(ωt, x˜, θˆ)+ c · δ(x, x˜)} (25)
In this formulation c is a hyper-parameter which trades of minimization of the loss L(ωt, x˜, θˆ) and
the perturbation δ(·, ·). Approaches which minimize this expression are the Carlini and Wagner L2
(C&W) attack [21] and the "Elastic-net Attacks to DNNs" (EAD) attack [35]. While the optimization
expression is different, these methods are also a form of PGD and therefore are expected to have
similar properties as other PGD-based attacks [25]. The C&W and EAD are considered to be
particularly strong L2 and L1 attacks, and Prior Networks need to be assessed on their ability to be
robust to and detect them. However, adaptation of these attacks to Prior Networks is non-trivial and
left to future work.
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B.2 Adversarial Training of DNNs and Prior Networks
Prior Networks and DNNs considered in section 6 are trained on a combination of natural and
adversarially perturbed data, which is known as adversarial training. DNNs are trained on L∞
targeted FGSM attacks which are generated dynamically during training from the current training
minibatch. The target class ωt is selected from a uniform categorical distribution, but such that it
is not the true class of the image. The magnitude of perturbation  is randomly sampled for each
image in the minibatch from a truncated normal distribution, which only yields positive values, with
a standard deviation of 30 pixels:
 ∼ Npos(0, 30
128
) (26)
The perturbation strength is sampled such that the model learns to be robust to adversarial attacks
across a range of perturbations. The DNN is then trained via maximum likelihood on both the natural
and adversarially perturbed version of the minibatch.
Adversarial training of the Prior Network is a little more involved. During training, an adversarially
perturbed version of the minibatch is generated using the targeted FGSM method. However, the loss
is not the negative log-likelihood of a target class, but the reverse KL-divergence (eqn. 10) between
the model and a targeted Dirichlet which is focused on a target class which is chosen from a uniform
categorical distribution (but not the true class of the image). For this loss the target concentration is
the same as for natural data (βin = 1e2). The Prior Network is then jointly trained on the natural and
adversarially perturbed version of the minibatch using the following loss:
L(θ,D) =LRKLin (θ,Dtrain;βin) + γ · LRKLadv (θ,Dadv;βadv) (27)
Here, the concentration of the target class for natural data is βin = 1e2 and for adversarially perturbed
data βadv = 1, where the concentration parameters are set via 6. Setting βadv = 1 results in a very
wide Dirichlet distribution whose mode and mean are closest to the target class. This ensures that
the prediction yields the correct class and that all measure of uncertainty, such as entropy of the
predictive posterior or the mutual information, are high. Note, that due to the nature of the reverse
KL-divergence loss, adversarial inputs which have a very small perturbation  and lie close to their
natural counterparts will naturally have a target concentration which is an interpolation between the
concentration for natural data and for adversarial data. The degree of interpolation is determined by
the OOD loss weight γ, as discussed in section 3.
It is necessary to point out that FGSM attack are used because they are computationally cheap to
compute during training. However, iterative adversarial attacks can also be considered during training,
although this will make training much slower.
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Appendix C Jointly Assessing Adversarial Attack Robustness and Detection
In order to investigate detection of adversarial attacks, it is necessary to discuss how to assess the
effectiveness of an adversarial attack in the scenario where detection of the attack is possible. Previous
work on detection of adversarial examples [38, 39, 40, 14, 15] assesses the performance of detection
methods separately from whether an adversarial attack was successful, and use the standard measures
of adversarial success and detection performance. However, in a real deployment scenario, an attack
can only be considered successful if it both affects the predictions and evades detection. Here, we
develop a measure of performance to assess this.
For the purposes of this discussion the adversarial generation process Aadv will be defined to either
yield a successful adversarial attack xadv or an empty set ∅. In a standard scenario, where there is no
detection, the efficacy of an adversarial attack on a model6 can be summarized via the success rate S
of the attack:
S = 1
N
N∑
i=1
I(Aadv(xi, ωt)), I(x) =
{
1, x 6= ∅
0, x = ∅ (28)
Typically S is plotted against the total maximum perturbation  from the original image, measured as
either the L1, L2 or L∞ distance from the original image.
Consider using a threshold-based detection scheme where a sample is labelled ’positive’ if some
measure of uncertaintyH(x), such as entropy or mutual information, is less than a threshold T and
’negative’ if it is higher than a threshold:
IT (x) =
{
1, T > H(x)
0, T ≤ H(x) (29)
The performance of such a scheme can be evaluated at every threshold value using the true positive
rate tp(T ) and the false positive rate fp(T ):
tp(T ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
IT (xi), fp(T ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
IT (Aadv(xi, ωt)) (30)
The whole range of such trade offs can be visualized using a Receiver-Operating-Characteristic
(ROC) and the quality of the trade-off can be summarized using area under the ROC curve. However,
a standard ROC curve does account for situations where the process Aadv(·) fails to produce a
successful attack. In fact, if an adversarial attack is made against a system which has a detection
scheme, it can only be considered successful if it both affects the predictions and evades detection.
This condition can be summarized in the following indicator function:
IˆT (x) =

1, T > H(x)
0, T ≤ H(x)
0, x = ∅
(31)
Given this indicator function, a new false positive rate fˆP (T ) can be defined as:
fˆp(T ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
IˆT (Aadv(xi, ωt)) (32)
This false positive rate can now be seen as a new Joint Success Rate which measures how many
attacks were both successfully generated and evaded detection, given the threshold of the detection
scheme. The Joint Success Rate can be plotted against the standard true positive rate on an ROC
curve to visualize the possible trade-offs. One possible operating point is where the false positive rate
is equal to the false negative rate, also known as the Equal Error-Rate point:
fˆP (TEER) = 1− tP (TEER) (33)
Throughout this work the EER false positive rate will be quoted as the Joint Success Rate.
6Given an evaluation dataset Dtest = {xi, yi}Ni=1
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Appendix D Additional Adversarial Attack Detection Experiments
In this appendix additional experiments on adversarial attack detection are presented. In figure 6
adaptive whitebox adversarial attacks generated by iteratively minimizing KL divergence between
the original and target (permuted) categorical distributions LKLPMF are compared to attacks generated
by minimzing the KL-divergence between the predicted and permuted Dirichlet distributions LKLDIR.
Performance is assessed only against Prior Network models. The results show that KL PMF attacks
are more successful at switching the prediction to the desired class and at evading detection. The
could be due to the fact that Dirichlet distributions which are sharp at different corners have limited
common support, making the optimization of the KL-divergence between them more difficult than
the KL-divergence between categorical distributions.
(a) C10 Success Rate (b) C10 ROC AUC (c) C10 Joint Success Rate
Figure 6: Comparison of performance of whitebox adaptive PGD MIM L∞ attacks which minimize
the KL-divergence between PMFs (KL PMF) and Dirichlet distributions (KL DIR) on CIFAR-10.
Results in figure 7 show that L2 PGD Momentum Iterative attacks which minimize the LKLPMF loss
are marginally more successful than the L∞ version of these attacks. However, it is necessary to
consider appropriate adaptation of the C&W L2 attacks to the loss functions considered in this work
for a more aggressive set of L2 attacks.
(a) C10 Success Rate (b) C10 ROC AUC (c) C10 Joint Success Rate
(d) C100 Success Rate (e) C100 ROC AUC (f) C100 Joint Success Rate
Figure 7: Comparison of performance of whitebox adaptive L∞ and L2 PGD MIM attacks against
Prior Networks trained on CIFAR-10 (C10) and CIFAR-100 (C100) datasets.
17
